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1961] NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
CONGRESSIONAL GRANT OF IMMUNITY FROM STATE
PROSECUTION
Petitioner was subpoenaed to appear before a federal grand
jury investigating violations of federal narcotics laws.' When
asked questions relevant to the subject before the grand jury he
declined to answer on the ground that his answers might tend to
incriminate him. Under the provisions of the Narcotics Control
Act 2 he was given immunity from prosecution. He still refused
to answer on the theory that the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation protects against prosecution in state courts, and that since
prosecution of narcotics violations is a "subject that has tradi-
tionally been within the police power of the states"" and reserved
to them under the tenth amendment, the immunity granted did
not constitutionally extend to state prosecutions and thus was
not co-extensive with the privilege it sought to replace. The fed-
eral district court held that a federal immunity statute need not
grant immunity from state prosecution to be valid since the fed-
eral privilege against self-incrimination does not apply in state
courts, and found petitioner guilty of contempt for refusing to
answer.4 The court of appeals affirmed.5 On certiorari6 to the
United States Supreme Court, held, affirmed, two Justices dis-
senting.7 The Narcotics Control Act validly grants immunity
1. Petitioner was then serving a five-year sentence for a federal narcotics
offense. United States v. Reina, 242 F.2d 302 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S.
913 (1957).
2. 70 STAT. 574 (1956), 18 U.S.C. § 1406 (1958) : "Whenever in the judgment
of a United States Attorney the testimony of any witness . . . in any case or
proceeding before any grand jury or court of the United States involving any viola-
tion of [certain federal narcotics statutes] is necessary to the public interest, he,
upon the approval of the Attorney General, shall make application to the court
that the witness shall be instructed to testify. . . . But no such witness shall be
prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any
transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he is compelled, after having
claimed his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify . . . nor shall testimony
so compelled be used as evidence in any criminal proceeding . . . against him in
any court."
8. Reina v. United States, 81 Sup. Ct. 260, 263 (1960).
4. In re Reina, 170 F. Supp. 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
5. United States v. Reina, 273 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1959).
6. 362 U.S. 939 (1960).
7. The dissenting opinion was written by Mr. Justice Black, with whom Mr.
Chief Justice Warren concurred. The dissenters regard the summary contempt
conviction as an "adjudication of guilt for a crime to be committed in the future."
81 Sup. Ct. 260, 265 (1960). They feel that no contempt conviction can stand
unless the accused be tried in accordance with the law of the land, including indict-
ment by a grand jury and a determination of guilt by a petit jury. Although the
instant note is not concerned with the problem raised by the dissenters, it is inter-
esting to note that, in light of the fact that Mr. Justice Douglas wrote such a
vigorous dissent in Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956), he did not
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
from state prosecution. Since the constitutional enactments of
Congress are the supreme law of the land, and since Congress
has the power to enact narcotics laws, all that is required to
justify restricting state power to prosecute in this area is a
finding that the legislation is necessary and proper to the effec-
tive exercise of the granted power. Reins v. United States, 81
Sup. Ct. 260 (U.S. 1960).
The privilege against self-incrimination is available to a de-
fendant in every jurisdiction in the United States.8 However,
most jurisdictions disarm this privilege with statutes 9 granting
immunity from prosecution to those who facilitate law enforce-
ment by giving testimony. To meet constitutional requirements,
an immunity statute must grant protection at least co-extensive
with the privilege it seeks to supplant.'0 Since federal and state
governments are considered as separate and distinct sovereign-
ties, it was held in United States v. Murdock" that a federal im-
munity statute need only grant immunity from federal prosecu-
tion to be valid. However, Congress has enacted statutes that
purport to grant immunity from state as well as federal prosecu-
tion.1 2 Whether Congress may validly do so was first considered
in the case of Brown v. Walker.'5 There a witness was granted
immunity under the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act,' 4
but refused to testify, contending that he was still amenable to
state prosecution. In affirming the contempt conviction the Su-
preme Court indicated that the act validly granted immunity
dissent from the majority opinion. In Ullmann, which raised almost identical
issues as the instant case, Mr. Justice Douglas found the whole idea behind im-
munity statutes repugnant to the Constitution. He felt that the privilege against
self-incrimination was absolute and protected not only from the danger of con-
viction with one's own words but also from the risk of prosecution, and from
exposure to infamy and disgrace.
8. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2252 (3d ed. 1940).
9. Id. § 2281.
10. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
11. 284 U.S. 141 (1931). Accord, Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
12. 70 STAT. 574 (1956), 18 U.S.C. § 1406 (1958) ; 68 STAT. 745 (1954), 18
U.S.C. § 3486 (1958) ; 62 STAT. 833 (1948), 18 U.S.C. §3486 (1958) ; 27 STAT.
443 (1893), 49 U.S.C. § 46 (1958) ; REV. STAT. §§ 859, 860 (1875) ; 11 STAT. 155
(1857). A collection of immunity statutes may be found in Shapiro v. United
States, 335 U.S. 1, n. 4 (1948). A state cannot constitutionally grant immunity
from federal prosecution. Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S. 372 (1905). However, some
states have held that a witness may not be compelled to testify under a state im-
munity statute where he would be amenable to prosecution by the federal govern-
ment. Boynton v. State, 75 So.2d 211 (Fla. 1954) ; State ea rel. Mitchell v. Kelly,
71 So.2d 887 (Fla. 1954) ; Commonwealth v. Rhine, 303 S.W.2d 301 (Ky. App.
1957) ; State v. Dominguez, 228 La. 284, 82 So.2d 12 (1955) ; State ea rel. Doran
v. Doran, 215 La. 151, 39 So.2d 894 (1949) ; People v. Den Uyl, 318 Mich. 645,
29 N.W.2d 284 (1947).
13. 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
14. 27 STAT. 443 (1893), 49 U.S.C. § 46 (1958).
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from state prosecution. 5 In Adams v. Maryland's the Court af-
firmed the right of Congress to prevent states from using testi-
mony obtained before a congressional investigatory body in a
criminal proceeding. The opinion of the Court used language
strongly indicating that Congress also had the power to grant
immunity from state prosecution. 17 The problem was recently
considered in Ullmann v. United States.8 Although granted im-
munity under the provisions of the Federal Compulsory Testi-
mony Act,' 9 Ullmann refused to testify on the grounds that the
immunity granted did not extend to state prosecution, urging that
Congress may not limit the right of the states to enforce crimi-
nal law. In upholding Ullmann's contempt conviction the Court
said that the paramount authority of Congress to safeguard na-
tional security justified the grant of immunity from state prose-
cution and restriction of state authority in this area.20 Although
in all three of these cases the Court used the "necessary and
proper"21 and "supremacy" 22 clauses as vehicles for justifying
federal restrictions on state criminal proceedings, it must be
noted that the statutes in question were based on exclusive and
pre-emptive federal powers, i.e., the commerce power in Brown
v. Walker; the congressional investigatory power in Adams v.
Maryland; and internal security and national defense in Ullmann
v. United States. For this reason some doubt has been expressed
as to the power of Congress to grant immunity from state prose-
cution where federal power is not occupying such a paramount
position.28
15. 161 U.S. 591, 606-07 (1896).
16. 347 U.S. 179 (1954).
17. Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179, 183 (1954): "Little need be said about
the contention that Congress lacks power to bar state courts from convicting a
person for crime on the basis of evidence he has given to help the national legis-
lative bodies carry on their governmental functions. Congress has power to sum-
mon witnesses before either House or before their committees. McGrain v. Daugh-
erty, 273 U.S. 135. Article I of the Constitution permits Congress to pass laws
'necessary and proper' to carry into effect its power to get testimony. We are
unable to say that the means Congress has here adopted to induce witnesses to
testify is not 'appropriate' and 'plainly adopted to that end.' McCulloch v. Mary-
land, 4 Wheat. 316, 421. And, since Congress in the legitimate exercise of its
powers enacts 'the supreme Law of the Land,' state courts are bound by § 3486,
even though it affects their rules of practice. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591,
606-608."
18. 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
19. 68 STAT. 745 (1954), 18 U.S.C. § 3486 (1958).
20. 350 U.S. 422, 436 (1956).
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
22. Id. art. VI.
23. See Tedesco v. United States, 255 F.2d 35, 39 (6th Cir. 1958) ; Comment,
11 WESTERN REsEVE L. REV. 264, 270 (1960) ; Note, 29 RocKY MT. L. REv. 127,
129 (1956).
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Any uncertainty which may have existed about the power of
Congress to grant immunity from state prosecution in the latter
situation has been dispelled by the instant case. In precise lan-
guage the Court held that if Congress has the power to legislate,
it has the power to grant immunity from state prosecution as
long as it was necessary and proper to do So. 2 4 The Court stated
that no support could be found in the Constitution for making
distinctions among particular granted powers. Thus since Con-
gress has undoubted power to enact narcotics laws25 and since a
grant of immunity from state prosecution would enhance en-
forcement of these laws, the grant of immunity from state prose-
cution was constitutional even though the states have tradition-
ally exercised authority in this area.26
The instant case is important in two particular aspects.
First, it clearly sets forth the formula to be applied for deter-
mining when the federal government may limit state law en-
forcement. Because of the broad and extensive powers of Con-
gress to legislate in almost any area, it is at least theoretically
possible for it to severely restrict state criminal prosecutions.
Although it is not certain to what extent federal immunity stat-
utes will be used in actual practice, nevertheless, it would seem
that such a system is open to abuse. For example, if a person
with some degree of influence were in danger of state prosecu-
tion, arrangements might be made to summon him before an in-
vestigating committee or a federal grand jury where he could
be given an "immunity bath." Secondly, the instant case marks
the second time that the Supreme Court has avoided reconsider-
ing United States v. Murdock,27 wherein it was held that a fed-
eral immunity statute need only grant immunity from federal
24. 81 Sup. Ct. 260, 263 (1960) : "Congress may legislate immunity restricting
the exercise of state power to the extent necessary and proper for the more ef-
fective exercise of a granted power .... The relevant inquiry here is thus simply
whether the legislated state immunity is necessary and proper to the more effective
enforcement of the undoubted power to enact the narcotics laws."
25. United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42 (1950) ; Nigro v. United States, 276
U.S. 332 (1928) ; Alston v. United States, 274 U.S. 289 (1927); Yee Hem v.
United States, 268 U.S. 178 (1925); United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86
(1919) ; Brolan v. United States, 236 U.S. 216 (1915).
26. 81 Sup. Ct. 260, 263-64 (1960) ("[D]istinctions based upon the particular
granted power concerned have no support in the Constitution .... And the super-
session of state prosecution is not the less valid because the states have tradition-
ally regulated the traffic in narcotics."). It could well be argued that the broad
language of the instant case is dictum since the power of Congress to control the
flow of narcotics is based on the paramount and preemptive powers of Congress
in the fields of interstate commerce and taxation. If such is the case, then little
consolation has been afforded the authorities cited in note 23 supra.
27. 284 U.S. 141 (1931). The first time that the Court avoided reconsidering
Murdock was in Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
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prosecution to be constitutional. In disposing of the instant case
the Court could simply have said, as did the lower courts, that
since the narcotics control act grants immunity from federal
prosecution, this case is controlled by United States v. Murdock,
and it would have been unnecessary to consider whether or not
it was constitutional to grant immunity from state prosecution
in this area. The instant case might be urged to support the posi-
tion that the Murdock decision is open to question 28 but for the
fact that since the Ullmann decision the Court has continually
espoused the "two sovereignties" theory. 29 It may be that the
Court by-passed the Murdock rationale and seized upon both Ull-
mann and Reina to set the limits of Congress' power to grant
immunity from state prosecution.
Walter I. Lanier, Jr.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - SEGREGATION OF FACILITIES USED BY AN
INTERSTATE Bus LINE
Petitioner, a Negro, was travelling by interstate bus through
the South. During a stopover he entered a terminal restaurant
and found that it was segregated into white and colored sections.
Disregarding the division, petitioner sat down in the white sec-
tion where he was refused service and was eventually arrested
by an officer upon request of the proprietor. He was subsequent-
ly convicted and fined $10.00 in the Police Justice's Court of
Richmond for violating a Virginia trespass law. The terminal
restaurant which petitioner entered was leased by the Trailways
Bus Terminal, Inc., a Virginia corporation, to the manager of
the restaurant. The lease provided that the operation of the
restaurant should be in keeping with the character of service of
a modern bus terminal.' Petitioner appealed to the city court of
28. That the Murdock holding is open to question is especially true in light of
the following extract taken from the majority opinion in the instant case (81
Sup. Ct. 260, 262) : "Both courts below passed the question whether the statute
grants state immunity because, assuming only federal immunity is granted, they
held that United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, 52 S. Ct. 63, 76 L. Ed. 210,
settled that the Fifth Amendment does not protect a federal witness from answer-
ing questions which might incriminate him under state law. D.C., 170 F. Supp. at
page 595; 2 Cir., 273 F.2d at page 235. Petitioner contends that Murdock should
be re-examined and overruled. We have no occasion to consider this contention,
since in our view § 1406 constitutionally grants immunity from both federal and
state prosecutions." (Emphasis added.)
29. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959) ; Bartkus v. Illinois, 359
U.S. 121 (1959) ; Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958).
1. Actually, this was only one provision in the lease. The majority opinion
summarized the lease provisions as follows: "Terminal covenanted to lease this
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